

ITEM NO. 42.2		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT TVC/LIA Dwg No. 2294819-506.508/ 2294821-503 SHEET 1 OF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
<p>A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.</p> <p>IYC</p> <p>A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic.</p> <p>A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.</p> <p>A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver.</p> <p>A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation.</p> <p>A6 Output Voltage Regulator, Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.</p> <p>A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)</p> <p>A8 High Voltage Power Supply.</p> <p>A9 Target Preamplifier.</p> <p>A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking.</p> <p>A12 Shading Hysteresis Generator.</p> <p>A13 SFT Tube</p>	<p>(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><b>DESIGN FEATURES</b></p> <p>The TVC/Lens Assembly is comprised of 16 electrical subassemblies; 13 subassemblies are RCA Astro designed and fabricated using standard printed-circuit board type of construction. The remaining three assemblies, high voltage power supply, oscillator, and stepper motors, are vendor supplied components which have been specified and purchased according to RCA Specification Control Drawings (SCDs) prepared by engineering and reliability assurance. Specifications per the SCD are prepared to establish the design, performance, test, qualification, and acceptance requirements for a procured piece of equipment.</p> <p>Parts, materials, processes, and design guidelines for the Shuttle CCTV program are specified in accordance with RCA 2295503. This document defines the program requirements for selection and control of EEE parts. To the maximum extent, and consistent with availability, all parts have been selected from military specifications at the JAN level, as a minimum. In addition to the overall selection criteria, a subset of general purpose preferred parts has been defined by this document and the RCA Government Systems Division Standard Parts List. In the case of the CMOS and TTL family of microcircuits, devices are screened and tested to the MIL-STD-883C equivalent and procured under the designations of HI-REL/3WQ and SNC 54LS from RCA-SSD and Texas Instruments Corp., respectively. Parts not included in the above documents have been used in the design only after a nonstandard item approval form (NSIAF) has been prepared, submitted to Reliability Assurance Engineering (RAE) and approved for use in the specific application(s) defined in the NSIAF by NASA-JSC.</p> <p>Worst-Case Circuit Analyses have been performed and documented for all circuit designs to demonstrate that sufficient operating margins exist for all operating conditions. The analysis was worst-case-in that the value for each of the variable parameters was set to limits that will drive the output to a maximum (or minimum).</p> <p>A component application review and analysis was conducted to verify that the applied stress on each piece part by the temperature extremes identified with environmental qualification testing does not exceed the stress derating values identified in RCA 2295503.</p> <p>In addition, an objective examination of the design was performed through a PDR and CDR to verify that the TVC/Lens assembly met specification and contractual requirements.</p>	

REVISED 5-7-87

AREA NO. 4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT TYC/CLA DWG NO. 2294B19-506, 508/ 2294B21-501 SHEET 2 OF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  Worst case: Loss of mission critical video.	<p><b>DESIGN FEATURES (Continued)</b></p> <p><b>BAKE BOARD DESIGN (A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A12)</b></p> <p>The design of the associated boards A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A12 is constructed from laminated copper-clad epoxy glass sheets (NEHA G-10) Grade FR-4), PER MIL-P-55612A. Circuit connections are made through printed traces which run from point to point on the board surfaces. Every trace terminates at an annular ring. The annular ring surrounds the hole in which a component lead or terminal is located. This ring provides a footing for the solder, ensuring good mechanical and electrical performance. Its size and shape are governed by MIL-P-55640 as are trace widths, spacing and routing. These requirements are reiterated specifically in drawing notes to further assure compliance. Variations between the artwork master and the final product (due to irregularities of the etching process) are also controlled by drawing notes. This prevents making defective boards from good artwork. Holes which house no lead or terminal, but serve only to electrically interconnect the different board layers, contain stitch bars for mechanical support and increased reliability.</p> <p>The thru holes are drilled from a drill tape thus eliminating the possibility of human error and allowing tight control over hole and annular ring concentricity, an important reliability criterion. After drilling and etching, all copper cladding is tin-lead plated per MIL-STO-1495. This provides for easy and reliable soldering at the time of board assembly, even after periods of prolonged storage.</p> <p><b>BOARD ASSEMBLY DESIGN (A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A9, A12)</b></p> <p>All components are installed in a manner which assures maximum reliability. Component leads are pre-tinned, allowing total wetting of solder joints. All leads are formed to provide stress relief and the bodies of large components are staked. Special mounting and handling instructions are included in each drawing required after final assembly. The board is coated with urethane which protects against humidity and contamination.</p>

ITEM NO. 4.2.2	CRITICALITY 2/2	SHUTTLE CCIV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT INV/CLIA DWG NO. 2204819-506, 508/ 2204821-503 SHEET 3 OF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON THIS ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
<p>A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.</p> <p><b>A1C</b> A2 Command Decode logic. Command Execution logic. Camera Timing logic. <b>A3</b> Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment. <b>A4</b> Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. <b>A5</b> Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. <b>A6</b> Output Voltage Regulator, Input Voltage Pre-Regulator. <b>A7</b> Primary Oscillator/Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering) <b>A8</b> High Voltage Power Supply. <b>A9</b> Target Preamplifier. <b>A10</b> Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking. <b>A12</b> Shading Waveform Generator. <b>A14</b> SIT tube</p>	<p>(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.</p> <p><b>Worst Case:</b> Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><b>DESIGN FEATURES (Continued)</b></p> <p><b>BARE BOARD CONSTRUCTION (A2)</b></p> <p>The boards are of "welded wire" construction. At the bare board level this does not distinguish it from a normal PC board except that holes which will take weld pins generally are not connected to PC traces. Only those pins which bring power and ground potentials to the ICs are on PCs. An annular ring surrounds the hole in the board where each power and ground pin is located. These pins are then soldered to the trace like any other component lead. Aside from this feature, all design &amp; construction techniques used in PC board layout apply.</p> <p><b>BOARD ASSEMBLY (A2)</b></p> <p>The drilled and etched boards are populated with several hundred solderable or weldable pins. Power and ground pins, as well as connector pins, are soldered in place. Discrete components (resistors, diodes, capacitors) are attached to bifurcated terminals, where they are soldered. Flatpack ICs are welded, lead-by-lead, to the tops of the weld pins. After welding, extra lead material is trimmed away. Circuit connections are made using #30 AWG nickel weld wire. The wire is welded to the pin surfaces on the board backside. All wire welds are done using a machine which is tape driven, thus eliminating the possibility of miswiring due to operator error. All wiring &amp; circuit performance is tested prior to box-level installation. After successful testing, components are staked as required by drawing notes and the assembly is coated with urethane.</p> <p>The board is inserted in the box on card-edge guides, in the same manner as the other PC boards.</p> <p><b>BOARD PLACEMENT</b></p> <p>The A7-A low voltage power supply board is bolted in place at 6 points around its perimeter. Four of these mounting screws also pass through and lie down the smaller A7-H board. These two boards are mounted face-to-face, separated by the standoffs. Electrical interconnections are achieved by jumper wires between the two boards. The A7-A houses a 34 pin connector which brings in power and signals from outside the module.</p> <p>The A7 module includes these two boards as well as power transistor Q4. The module housing is bent aluminum sheet, comprised of two halves screwed together. The boards and Q4 are secured to the lower half, and wired together. Then the upper half is put in place. By mounting Q4 directly to the aluminum housing, good thermal performance is assured.</p> <p>The A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A12 boards are secured in the electronics assembly by gold-plated beryllium copper card guides. Connections are made to the mother board with blind-mated connectors. Disengagement during launch is prevented by a cover which spans the board's free edge.</p>	

FMEA NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCIV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT	IVC/CLA
CRITICALITY	2/2		DIG NO.	2294819-506, 500/ 2294821-503
			SHEET	4 OF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM			
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	DESIGN FEATURES (Continued)		RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
TVC A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution logic. Camera Timing Logic. A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current. Horizontal Alignment. Vertical Alignment. A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator. A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering) A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier. A10 Beam Current Regulator. Latitude Blanking. A12 Shading Waveform Generator. A13 SIT Tube		A10 BOARD MOUNTING  Due to packaging constraints within the camera, the A10 TVC divider assembly is built in "cordwood" fashion. Two PC boards, each 2.1 inches square, are mounted opposite each other, separated by 3/4 inch long standoffs. Biaxial components span the distance between the boards and are soldered in place, one lead to each board. Some jumper wires are also mounted this way. All solder joints are staked. The boards have a 1-inch diameter hole through the center. The vidicon tube socket fits through this hole and has its flying leads soldered to thru-holes in one of the boards. At camera-level installation, the entire A10 module is inserted in place around the stem, of the vidicon tube and bolted in four places to the housing. The socket is then engaged manually to the tube, completing the installation.		
		BOARD MOUNTING  The A9 board is mounted to the target preamp housing by 4 #4-40 screws. This provides ample support since the board is only 1.9 x 2.1 inches. Electrical connection is by jumper wires soldered to board terminals. A sheet metal cover is installed over the board to protect it during handling and installation of the target preamp assembly.		
		The high-voltage power supply is purchased to a performance specification that details the design, qualification, and production requirements for use in the TV Camera System. It is designed for a minimum operational life of 8000 hours and shall exhibit no evidence of arcing, corona, or any other intermittent or continuous failure when operated at any atmospheric pressure from sea level to $1 \times 10^{-6}$ torr. All electronic components and materials used in the power supply design are verified to conform with the reliability requirements of the Shuttle CCIV program as outlined by NASA-JSC.		

FMEA NO. 4.2.2

CRITICALITY 2/2

## FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE

Infunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.

Command Decode Logic.  
 Command Execution Logic.  
 Camera Timing Logic.  
 Horizontal Deflection.  
 Vertical Deflection.  
 Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.  
 Black/White Clipper.  
 Gamma Correction.  
 Aperture Correction.  
 Shading Correction.  
 Video Output Driver.  
 Automatic Light Control.  
 Automatic Gain Control.  
 Dark Current Compensation.  
 Output Voltage Regulator.  
 Input Voltage Pre-regulator.  
 Primary Oscillator/  
 Driver (sync loss).  
 Secondary Rectifiers/ filters  
 (change of voltage or loss of filtering).  
 High Voltage Power Supply.  
 Target Preamplifier.  
 Beam Current Regulator.  
 Cathode Blanking.  
 Shading Waveform Generator.  
 SIT Tube

## FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM

- (1) Unable to open lens iris.
  - (2) Degradation of picture content.
- Worst Case:  
Loss of mission critical video.

SHUTTLE CCTV  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

UNIT TVC/CLA

DWG NO. 2294819-506 508/  
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## RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

The SIT tube is a selected high-grade silicon-diode-array target vidicon with an attached image intensifier for operating at low light levels. Faceplate exposure is controlled by means of an Automatic Light Control (ALC) function that restricts operation to  $2 \times 10^{-2}$  foot-candles. This can provide an SIT life of more than 1000 hours according to the manufacturer's recommendations. By providing exposure control when using the SIT tube, life can be extended to the point where reduced thermionic cathode emission will end its life, as in other camera tubes. Because of its excellent characteristics many military, medical, and scientific applications, in addition to surveillance applications, have been developed for low-light-level television cameras employing the SIT tube.

## QUALIFICATION TEST

For Qualification Test Flow, see Table 2 located at the front of this book.

FMEA NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	INITIAL DWG NO.	IVC/CLA
CRITICALITY	2/2		2294819-506, 508Z	2294821-503
SHEET	6 OF 10			
<u>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</u>		<u>FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM</u>		
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.		(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.		
IVC A2 Command Decode logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic.		HorsL Case: Loss of mission critical video.		
A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.				
A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver.				
A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation.				
A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.				
A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)				
A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier.				
A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking.				
A12 Shading Waveform Generator. A13 SII tube				
				<u>RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE</u>
				<u>ACCEPTANCE TEST</u>
				The CCTV systems' IVC/CLA is subjected directly, without vibration isolators which might be used in their normal installation, to the following testing:
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Vibration: 20-80Hz; 3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G<sup>2</sup>/Hz 80-350 Hz; 0.04 G<sup>2</sup>/Hz 350-750 Hz; -3 dB/10 Oct-slope Test Duration: 1 Minute per Axis Test Level: 6.1 Grms</li> </ul>
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Thermal Vacuum: In a pressure of <math>1 \times 10^{-5}</math> Torr, the temperature shall be as follows:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>125° F: Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour</li> <li>25° F: Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour</li> <li>125° F: Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
				The IVC/CLA may not have been subjected to the vacuum condition.
				for Acceptance Test Flow, see Table 1 located at the front of this book.
				<u>OPERATIONAL TEST</u>
				In order to verify that CCTV components are operational, a test must verify the health of all the command related components from the PHS (ATAI) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera/PTU, to the Camera/PTU command decoder. The test must also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSU's ability to route video, and the monitor's ability to display video. A similar test would be performed to verify the HDM command path.
				<u>Pre-Launch or Orbiter Test/In-Flight Test</u>
				<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Power CCTV System.</li> <li>2. Via the PHS panel, select a monitor as destination and the camera under test as source.</li> <li>3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel.</li> <li>4. Select "External Sync" on monitor.</li> <li>5. Observe video displayed on monitor. Note that if video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster) then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite sync from the RCU and that the camera is producing synchronized video.</li> <li>6. Send Pan, Tilt, Focus, Zoom, ALC, and Gamma commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify operation.</li> <li>7. Select downlink as destination and camera under test as source.</li> <li>8. Observe video emitted by downlink.</li> </ol>

Revised 5-7-87

ITEM NO. 4.2.2

CRITICALITY 2/2

## FAILURE MODE AND

## CAUSE

A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.

TVC

- A2 Command Decode Logic.
- Command Execution Logic.
- Camera Timing Logic.
- A3 Horizontal Deflection.
- Vertical Deflection.
- Focus Current.
- Horizontal Alignment.
- Vertical Alignment.
- A4 Black/White Clipper.
- Gamma Correction.
- Aperture Correction.
- Shading Correction.
- Video Output Driver.
- A5 Automatic Gain Control.
- Automatic Gain Control.
- Dark Current Compensation.
- Output Voltage Regulator.
- Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.
- A6 Primary Oscillator/Driver (sync loss).
- Secondary Rectifiers/Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)
- A7 High Voltage Power Supply.
- A8 Target Preamplifier.
- A9 Beam Current Regulator.
- Cathode Blanking.
- A10 Shading Hysteresis Generator.
- A11 SIT tube

FAILURE EFFECT  
ON END ITEM

- (1) Unable to open lens iris.
- (2) Degradation of picture content.

## Worst Case:

Loss of mission critical video.

SHUTTLE CCTV  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

UNIT TVC/CLA  
DNG NO. 2294819-506, 500Z  
2294821-503  
SHEET 1 OF 10

## RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

## QA/INSPECTION

Procurement Control - The TVC/CLA EEE Parts and hardware items are procured from approved vendors and suppliers, which meet the requirements set forth in the CCIV contract and Quality Plan Work Statement (WS-259317b). Resident DCAS personnel review all procurement documents to establish the need for GSI on selected parts (PAI 517).

Incoming Inspection and Storage - Incoming Quality inspections are made on all received materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot and retained in file by drawing and control numbers for future reference and traceability. All EEE parts are subjected to incoming acceptance tests as called for in PAI 315 - Incoming Inspection Test Instructions. Incoming flight parts are further processed in accordance with RCA 1046684 - Preconditioning and Acceptance Requirements for Electronic Parts, with the exception that DPA and PIND testing is not performed. Mechanical items are inspected per PAI 316 - Incoming Inspection Instructions for mechanical items, PAI 305 - Incoming Quality Control Inspection Instruction, and PAI 612 - Procedure for Processing Incoming or Purchased Parts Designated for Flight Use. Accepted items are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retained under specified conditions until fabrication is required. Non-conforming materials are held for Material Review Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI-307, PAI 1QC-511).

Board Assembly & Test - Prior to the start of TVC or CLA board assembly, all items are verified to be correct by stock room personnel, as the items are accumulated to form a kit. The items are verified again by the operator who assembles the kit by checking against the as-built-parts-list (ABPL). DCAS Mandatory Inspection Points are designated for all printed circuit, wire wrap and welded wire boards, plus harness connectors for soldering/wiring, crimping, solder splices and quality workmanship prior to coating of the component side of boards and sleeving of harnesses.

## TVC Boards

Specific TVC board assembly and test instructions are provided in drawing notes, and applicable documents are called out in the Fabrication Procedure and Record (FPR-2294819) and parts list PL2294819. These include shuttle TVC assembly notes 2593660, Process Standard RTV-S66 2280081, Process Standard - Bonding Velcro Tape 2280869, Specification Soldering 2280749, Specification Name Plate Application 1960167, Specification - Crimping 2280080, Specification - Bonding and Staking 2280878, Specification - Urethane coating 2280877, Specification - Locking compound 2026116, Specification Epoxy Adhesive 2010985, Specification - Marking 2280876, Specification - Workmanship 8030075, Specification - Bonding and Staking 2280075.

FMEA NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT	TVC/CLA
Criticality	2/2		DMG NO.	2294819-506, 5097 2294821-503
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE			SHEET	8 OF 10
FAL		FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM		RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
A1	A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.	DATA/INSPECTION (Continued)	TVC Assembly and Test - An open box test is performed per TP-LT-2294819, and an Acceptance Test per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPM operations in accordance with PAT-204, PAT-205, PAT 206 and PAT 212. DCAS personnel witness TVC button-up and critical torquing.
A2	IVL Command Decode Logic, Command Execution logic, Camera Timing Logic.	Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.		TVC/CLA Assembly and Test - After a TVC and an CLA have been tested individually, they are mated and a final acceptance test is performed per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum environments. RCA and DCAS personnel monitor these tests and review the acceptance test data/results. These personnel also inspect for conformance after all repair, rework and retest.
A3	Horizontal Deflection, Vertical Deflection, Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.			Preparation for Shipment - The TVC and CLA are separated prior to shipment after fabrication and testing is complete. Each is packaged according to CCTV Letter 801B and 2280746. Process standard for Packaging and Handling guidelines. All related documentation including assembly drawings, Parts List, ADPL, Test Data, etc., is gathered and held in a documentation folder assigned specifically to each assembly. This folder is retained for reference. An EIDP is prepared for each assembly in accordance with the requirements of HS-259012b. RCA QC and DCAS personnel witness crating, packaging, packing, and marking, and review the EIDP for completeness and accuracy.
A4	Black/White Clipper, Gamma Correction, Aperture Correction, Shading Correction, Video Output Driver.			
A5	Automatic Light Control, Automatic Gain Control, Dark Current Compensation.			
A6	Output Voltage Regulator, Input Voltage Pre-regulator,			
A7	Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)			
A8	High Voltage Power Supply.			
A9	Target Preamplifier.			
A10	Beam Current Regulator, Cathode Blanking.			
A11	Shading Waveform Generator.			
A12	SIT Tube			

FMEA NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT	TVC/CIA
CRITICALITY	2/2		DWG NO.	2294819-506, 50B/ 2294821-503
			SHEET	4 DF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE		
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	<u>FAILURE HISTORY</u> TDR - H2575 - Log #0400 - TVC S/N 005-501 <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Vibration Environment Video presentation rotated approximately 6° after vibration. <u>Cause:</u> Vidicon Yoke nut became loose during vibration. <u>Corrective Action:</u> Reposition yoke, tighten nut and add staking to sensor assy's yoke nut. ECN (81073) issued.  TDR - H2576 - Log #0412 - TVC S/N 005-501 <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Vibration Environment CW rotation of picture after XY axis vibration. (Retest of TVC per TDR H2575.) <u>Cause:</u> Bonding of yoke (A1) broke loose allowing yoke to rotate during vibration. <u>Corrective Action:</u> Assembly procedure revised per ECN CCT 000 (81073) to provide for better staking of yoke.  TDR - H2560 - Log #0414 - TVC S/N 006-501 <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Vibration Environment Input current increased by 100 mA from normal input current during vibration in "Y" Axis. <u>Cause:</u> Defective capacitor C26 on A3 board. Analysis indicated manufacturing defect - capacitive element was loose inside metal case. <u>Corrective Action:</u> Remove and replace part. Retested camera per PHM directive. Capacitors removed from stock and returned to vendor. Reference memo CCTV-1(F)-241 for close out of TDR H2560.		
A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic.				
A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.				
A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver.				
A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation.				
A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.				
A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)				
A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier.				
A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking.				
A11 Shunting Waveform Generator.				
A12 SII tube				

FMEA NO. 4.2.2		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT TVC/CIA DWG NO. 2294819-506, 508/ 2294821-501 SHEET 9A DF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	Failure History (Continued)  TDR - W0988 - Log #0432 - TVC S/N 005-501 W0989 - Log #0428 - TVC S/N 005-501  Description: Acceptance Test Failure Box Level T/V Hot Environment Cluster of white spots in lower left quadrant of display on black field. Crazing of cement securing cover glass to fiberoptics faceplate evident.	Cause: Stresses exerted by potting material during temp. extremes resulted in de-lamination of the cover glass to SIT tube bonding.
TVC A2 Command Decode logic. Command Execution logic. Camera Timing logic. A1 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current. Horizontal Alignment. Vertical Alignment. A3 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator. A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering) A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier. A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking. A12 Shading Waveform Generator. A14 SIT tube		Corrective Action: Modified potting fixtures and technique used on SIT tube Dwg. #2295530 modified by ECR (B 20R2). SIT tubes returned to manufacturer for rework of encapsulation. Vendor to perform temp tests on tube prior to shipment to insure cover glass does not shift. REF CCTV Directives CCTV - (D) - 054, CCTV - (D) - 07D.	
		TDR - W2739 - Log #0485 TVC S/N 009-502  Description: Pre-launch failure Box Level Test Ambient Environment Problem report VSCS-201-0093 visual inspection of unit at KSC revealed a recessed pin 31 in the J1 connector. (location code function pin)	Cause: Error in manufacturing of the connector pin. It is 0.035" shorter in length than other pins in connector.
		Corrective Action: Remove and replace pin 31 in J1 connector. Test pins ability to lock into mating connector. Perform contact retention test to insure pin is locking as required. Inspect to insure pin is not pushed out of place.	
		JDR - W0001 - Log #0499 - TVC 013-502 TDR - W1278 - Log #0497 - TVC 013-502	Description: Qualification Test Failure Box Level (Qual. Model) Ambient Environment Output video intermittent.  Cause: SIT has low G4 current.

FMEA ID# <u>4.2.2</u>	CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCIV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/CLA</u> ORG NO. <u>2299019-506-508/</u> <u>2299021-503</u> SERIAL <u>98</u> OF <u>10</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON EMI ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)	
<u>IVC</u> A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution logic. Camera Timing logic. A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment. A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. A5 Automatic Gain Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator. A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering) A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preampifier. A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking. A12 Shading Waveform Generator. A13 SIT tube	<p><b>Corrective Action:</b> Remove and replace SIT. Defective tube returned to Lancaster for evaluation. Result: Tube failure verified.</p> <p><b>IDR - W4312 - Log #0506 - TVC S/N 014-502</b></p> <p><b>Description:</b> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Thermal Vac-Hot Environment Approx. 45 minutes into (1/V Hot) soak at +125°F video became distorted and TVC input current increased 710 mA to 800 mA.</p> <p><b>Cause:</b> Yoke deflection coil developed a short between horizontal and vertical deflection windings at 50°C. The short was eliminated when the temperature was reduced.</p> <p><b>Corrective Action:</b> Replaced defective yoke with new part. This is a random failure.</p> <p><b>IDR - W4627 - Log #0529 - TVC S/N 009-502</b></p> <p><b>Description:</b> Integration Test Failure Box Level Ambient Environment Center resolution measured 30% @ 300 TVL, should be 70% min. Amplitude appears to be intermittent.</p> <p><b>Cause:</b> Transformer T3 on the A7 Board had unusual interwinding capacity, causing ringing on the secondary resulting in a slightly higher output voltage.</p> <p><b>Corrective Action:</b> Interwinding capacity is not a parameter specified, nor can it be measured readily. Transmitter T3 removed &amp; replaced. Acceptance test screening will detect this problem if present on other units - This problem is considered a random failure.</p> <p><b>IDR - Y1281 - Log #0577, TVC S/N 017-504</b></p> <p><b>Description:</b> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Ambient Environment Oscillations in video output.</p> <p><b>Cause:</b> Poor grounding in pre-amp.</p>		

FMEA NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT	IVC/CIA
CRITICALITY	.2/2		ORG NO.	2294819-506, 508/ 2294821-503
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM		SCHEET	SC OF 10
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.			
TVC				
A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic.		<u>Failure History (Continued)</u>		
A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection, Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.		<u>Corrective Action:</u> Unit reworked to ECN COT 830 for ground problem.		
A4 Black/White Clipper, Gamma Correction, Aperture Correction, Shading Correction, Video Output Driver.		IDR - M1729 - Log #0570 - IVC S/N D20-502 IDR - M1730 - Log #0570 - WLA S/N 006-501 IDR - Y1404 - Log #0565 - IVC S/N D11-502		
A5 Automatic Light Control, Automatic Gain Control, Dark Current Compensation.		<u>Description:</u> Flight Failure Spacecraft Level IVC S/N D20, WLA S/N 006-STS-3 IVC S/N D11 - STS-2		
A6 Output Voltage Regulator, Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.		<u>Cause:</u> Coherent noise in output video presentation.		
A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)		<u>Corrective Action:</u> Removed excessive conformal coating. Spacers were cleaned and treated with alodine. Flow progress report has been modified to insure proper assembly of units.		
A8 High Voltage Power Supply.		IDR - Yb906 - Log #0630 - IVC S/N D19-504		
A9 Target Preconditioner.		<u>Description:</u> Flight Failure STS-5 Problem report VJCS-024		
A10 Beam Current Regulator, Cathode Blanking.		<u>Cause:</u> Intermittent Pan/Tilt reset command.		
A12 Shading Waveform Generator.		<u>Corrective Action:</u> Problem could not be verified thru extensive thermal testing.		
A13 SIT Tube		<u>Description:</u> Unit updated from group 504 to group 506 configuration. Instructed test director to carefully monitor operation of this camera during retesting, failure still could not be verified.		
		IDR - 90806 - Log #0606 - IVC S/N 024-506		
		<u>Description:</u> Pre-Launch Test Failure Box Level Ambient Environment <u>Cause:</u> Automatic Iris goes from open to close.		
		<u>Corrective Action:</u> None - unit returned to KSC.		

FMEA NO. <u>4.2.2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/CIA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506, 506/</u> <u>2294821-503,</u> SHEET <u>90</u> OF <u>10</u>
CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>		
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>	<b>FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM</b>	<b>RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE</b>
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	<b>FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)</b>  TDR - W1735 - Log #0223 - TVC S/N N/A -506  Description: Acceptance Test Failure Box level Ambient Environment High voltage power supply S/N 2046 exhibits internal arcing. This TDR was opened to investigate failure noted on TDR H6B70, Log #722.  Cause: Improper lead dress of high voltage terminal.  Corrective Action: HVPS S/N 2046 was one of eight units manufactured under purchase order G-T50999-4151-00F28 by Murata Erie. This problem is limited to units manufactured in 1982. All defective units have been screened and returned to Murata Erie for analysis and replacement.
TVC A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing logic. A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment. A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. A6 Input Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-regulator. A7 Primary Oscillators/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering) A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier. A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking. A12 Shading Waveform Generator. A14 SID Tube		 TDR - H6B70 - Log #0222 - TVC S/N 028-506  Description: Acceptance Test Failure Ambient Environment Box level test Approximately 40 seconds after initial turn on, the iris close command would be generated by TVC.  Cause: Internal short in the high voltage power supply (S/N 2046), which generated spikes on the POR line.  Corrective Action: H.V.P.S. removed from TVC and new H.V.P.S. installed. Tests indicated problem solved. Power supply returned to vendor for evaluation. Refer to TDR W1735, Log #723. The problem was attributed to improper lead dress of high voltage terminal. These leads have been rerouted and extra insulation added at the HV terminal for all new built units.
		 TDR - H-6875 - Log #0746 TVC S/N 014-506 TDR - W-6872 - Log #0742 TVC S/N 011-506  Cause: Resistor R6 on A10 board, failed.  Corrective Action: All flight cameras containing R6 resistor fabricated by ACI and dated with code 7813 will be replaced with new RN060 type resistors from ERH.

FMEA NO. 422		SHUTTLE CCIV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT TVC/CIA
CRITICALITY 2/2			DRW NO. 2294B19-506 508 2294B21-503
			SHEET 9E 01 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM		RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)	TDR - N6917 - Log #0748 - TVC S/N 030-506  <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Ambient Environment Video presentation very noisy when J4 cable is connected.  <u>Cause:</u> Sensor assembly clamp sleeve shorted to chassis. Insufficient insulation coating on clamp sleeve.  <u>Corrective Action:</u> New clamps were installed. All parts in controlled stores were inspected and all discrepant material rejected.
IVC A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic. A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current. Horizontal Alignment. Vertical Alignment. A3 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. A2 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator. A2 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (Sync Loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change in voltage or loss of filtering) A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier. A10 Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking. A12 Shading Waveform Generator. A14 STI Tube		TDR - W6925 - Log #0770 - TVC S/N 022-506  <u>Description:</u> Flight Failure (STS-8) Spacecraft Level  Horizontal streaking in picture gamma when in black stretch.  <u>Cause:</u> Incorrect shim installed. Face plate shim shorted to ground.  <u>Corrective Action:</u> Shim removed and correct shim installed per ECN-CC1859. All future TVC's will conform to this ECN.	TDR - A3249 - Log #0929 - TVC S/N 033-506  <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Thermal Vac. Ambient Environment Video locked in white clip mode.  <u>Cause:</u> Defective Transistor Q16 on A6 Board.  <u>Corrective Action:</u> Removed Q16 and replaced with new transistor. Q16 X-rayed and a dense particle was observed. Further analysis proved to be a loose and metallic particle. Considered to be random failure.
		TDR - A4093 - Log #0973 - TVC S/N 019-506  <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Vibration environment Out-tailed "Y" axis vibration, picture on monitor all white.	

FMEA NO. <u>4.2.2</u>	CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/CIA</u> DME NO. <u>2294B19-506</u> , <u>508</u> <u>2294B21-503</u> SHEET <u>4F</u> OF <u>10</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)	
IYC A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic. A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment. A4 Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver. A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation. A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator. A7 Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss). Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering). A8 High Voltage Power Supply. A9 Target Preamplifier. A10 Beam Current Regulator. (cathode blanking). A11 Shading Waveform Generator. A12 SIT Tube	<p>Cause: Defective Q7 on the A4 board. Product Assurance analysis revealed an open transistor Q7. They found an extraneous gold bond wire positioned so as to cause a short between the base leads of the dual transistors. Transistors with the same date code, plus all transistors with different date codes were X-rayed and no anomalies were found. Concluded that this was a random failure.</p> <p>TDR - H1746 - Log #1024, TVC S/N 011-506  Description: Pre-launch test failure Box Level Ambient Environment KSC DR.3C430012 ALC and Gamma controls intermittent. Pan and tilt operation intermittent.  Cause: Intermittent operation of ALC and Gamma commands could not be duplicated thru extensive thermal testing. Intermittent tilt motion due to improper position of right hand camera slide.  Corrective Action: Slides were re-positioned per ECN-CCT 3178. Retest indicated problem solved. Returned IVC 011 to "JSC" for further evaluation of ALC/GAMMA anomaly.</p> <p>TDR - B0146 - Log #1079 - IVC S/N 007-506  Description: Flight failure Flight A410 Evaluation test IVC returned from KSC for evaluation of white streaks in video observed during orbiter flight #410.  Cause: Arcing in vicinity of ground tab of face plate of SIT tube S/N J8294.</p> <p>Corrective Action: Removed tube S/N JB249 from sensor assembly, opened TBR-B0809, Log #1105 to track tube; tube returned to vendor. Installed new tube into sensor.</p> <p>TDR - B-0148 - Log #1085 - IVC S/N 044-506  Description: Acceptance Test failure Box Level Thermal-Vac Ambient Environment Distorted video seen on monitor. Distortion consisted of two types of noise, modulated and random.</p>		

FMEA NO. 4.2.2

CRITICALITY 2/2

SHUTTLE CCIV  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

UNIT TVC/CLA  
 DRG NO. 2294819-506, 500/  
 2294821-503  
 SHEET 96 OF 10

## FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE

A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.

TVC

- 12 Command Decode Logic, Command Execution Logic, Camera Timing Logic,
- 13 Horizontal Deflection, Vertical Deflection, Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment,
- 4 Black/White Clipper, Gamma Correction, Aperture Correction, Shading Correction, Video Output Driver,
- 5 Automatic Light Control, Automatic Gain Control, Dark Current Compensation,
- 6 Output Voltage Regulator, Input Voltage Pre-Regulator,
- 7 Primary Oscillator/Driver (sync loss), Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)
- 8 High Voltage Power Supply, Target Preamplifier,
- 10 Beam Current Regulator, Cathode Blanking,
- 11 Shading Waveform Generator,
- 14 SIT Tube

## FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM

- (1) Unable to open lens iris.
- (2) Degradation of picture content.

## Worst Case:

Loss of mission critical video.

## RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

## FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)

Cause: Random noise is caused by poor grounding of the A9 pre-amp. Modulated noise is due to A5 board operation.

Corrective Action: Random noise problem was cured by cleaning the A9 ground connections and the incorporation of ECN 009485 - redundant wire ground connection to the A9 pre-amp. Modulated noise problem was cured by incorporating ECN E1773 to the A5 board which limits the control voltage to the A8 high voltage power supply. TVC Group number was changed from 2294819-506 to 2294819-500.

TDR - B-2352 - Log # 1123 TVC S/N 033-506

Description: Pre-Launch Test Failure  
Box Level  
Ambient Environment

(Ref# 3CA420062) Noisy video, vertical lines with low light level).

Cause: Poor A9 pre-amplifier ground.

Corrective Action: ECN COT 1237. Written to add redundant ground lead.

TDR - B3451 - Log #1150 S/N 042-500

Description: Acceptance Test Failure  
Box Level  
Vibration Environment  
Vertical noise pattern present in video.

Cause: Poor ground connection on A9 pre-amplifier board thru conductive washers.

Corrective Action: ECN U-9584 (Ground wire installation) was installed in sensor assembly. This ECN incorporated in all previous units presently located at RCA, and all new build units.

TDR - B3518 - Log #1174 - TVC S/N 020-506

Description: Pre-Launch Test Failure  
Box Level  
Ambient Environment  
Problem report #DR.3C51001A  
Evaluate video noise problem

Cause: Poor grounding for pre-amp. TVC depended on a mechanical ground connection.

FMEA NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE/CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT IVC/CLA DWG NO. 2294019-506..508Z 2294021-503 SHEET 91 OF 10
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	<u>FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)</u>  <u>Corrective Action:</u> ECH CCT-1237 was prepared adding redundant hard wire ground. This ECN was incorporated into IVC S/N 02B and retest indicated problem resolved. This ECN will be incorporated into all TVC's in process.	
IYC		TDR - C0751 - Log #2002 - IVC S/N 024-508	
A2 Command Decode Logic. Command Execution logic. Camera Timing logic.		IDR - A3105 - Log #2097 - IVC S/N 024-508	
A3 Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection. Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.		 <u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure Box level Ambient Environment White ion spot visible in center of raster. Tube conditioning procedure operated to excess of 60 Hrs. which, reduced spot size to 20-25 IRE. Unit authorized to ship to NASA/JSC for further evaluation. The above unit returned from NASA (Ref. PR-DR 3C530032) with the 20-25 IRE spot.	
A4 Black/White Clipper, Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver.		 <u>Cause:</u> IVC tube operated in an unauthorized configuration or mode such as (1) extended exposure to bright light (2) loss of camera voltages, (3) exposed to light without lens assembly.	
A5 Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation.		 <u>Corrective Action:</u> SIT replaced with new tube. Old tube sent to RCA-Lancaster for analysis. Found silicon target burned. No corrective action possible on tube S/N 243B86. Tube to be labeled as non-flight, but may be used in non-critical application such as for TVC Trainer.	
A6 Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.		TDR - C4523 - Log #2039 - IVC 044-508	
A7 Primary Oscillators/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)		 <u>Description:</u> Evaluation Test Box Level Ambient Environment Output of high voltage power supply OV with 6.0 Vac control voltage, should be approximately 9 kv intermittent operation, slight rap on housing will produce 9 kv.	
A8 High Voltage Power Supply.		 <u>Cause:</u> Analysis of failure under investigation.	
A9 Target Preampifier.		 <u>Corrective Action:</u> N/A	
A10 Beam Current Regulator. Lathode Blanking.		 IIR - C0693 - Log #2042 - IVC S/N 042-508	
A11 Shading Waveform Generator.		 <u>Description:</u> Flight Failure STS 51F (26). Spacecraft level String like material on lens or TVC noticed in video presentation, also horizontal noise is present in output video.	
A12 SIT tube			

FMEA NO. 4.2.2		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT IVC/CIA DWG NO. 2294819-506, 508/ 2294821-503 SHEET 21 OF 10
CRITICALITY 2/2			
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON ENQ ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.	(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	FAILURE HISTORY (Continued)  Cause: String like material was found on face of SIT tube and could not be determined where it came from. Horizontal noise could not be duplicated.  Corrective Action: String removed with small brush. This is the first reported instance of such contamination. Horizontal noise in video as reported could not be duplicated during 9 days of thermal cycling and thermal vacuum testing. The probable cause of the video noise was external to the IVC and unknown at this time.	
IVC			
A2 Command Decode Logic, Command Execution Logic, Camera Timing Logic.			
A3 Horizontal Deflection, Vertical Deflection, Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.			
A4 Black/White Clipper, Gamma Correction, Aperture Correction, Shading Correction, Video Output Driver.			
A5 Automatic Light Control, Automatic Gain Control, Dark Current Compensation.			
A6 Output Voltage Regulator, Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.			
A7 Primary Oscillators/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)			
A8 High Voltage Power Supply.			
A9 Target Preamp/			
A10 Beam Current Regulator, Cathode Blanking.			
A12 Shading Waveform Generator.			
A13 SIT Tube			

ITEM NO.	4.2.2	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT	TVC/CIA
Criticality	2/2		DWG NO.	2294819-506-508/ 2294821-503
			SHEET	10 OF 10
<u>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</u>		<u>FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM</u>	<u>RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE</u>	
A malfunction in the camera to cause total loss of the active video signal or video information that will provide degraded performance. Composite sync and vertical blanking signals are useable and not affected.		(1) Unable to open lens iris. (2) Degradation of picture content.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	<u>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS</u> Loss of video. Possible loss of major mission objectives if RMS elbow is required. <u>CREW ACTIONS</u> If possible, continue RMS operations using alternative visual cues. <u>CREW TRAINING</u> Crew should be trained to use possible alternatives to CCTV. <u>MISSION CONSTRAINT</u> Where possible, procedures should be designed so they can be accomplished without CCTV.	
A1	Command Decode Logic. Command Execution Logic. Camera Timing Logic.			
A3	Horizontal Deflection. Vertical Deflection.			
A4	Focus Current, Horizontal Alignment, Vertical Alignment.			
A9	Black/White Clipper. Gamma Correction. Aperture Correction. Shading Correction. Video Output Driver.			
A12	Automatic Light Control. Automatic Gain Control. Dark Current Compensation.			
A16	Output Voltage Regulator. Input Voltage Pre-Regulator.			
A17	Primary Oscillator/ Driver (sync loss) Secondary Rectifiers/ Filters (change of voltage or loss of filtering)			
A18	High Voltage Power Supply.			
A19	Target Preamplifier.			
A10	Beam Current Regulator. Cathode Blanking.			
A12	Shading Waveform Generator.			
A14	SIT tube			